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NOV 27 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR: BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

ATTENTION : [REDACTED] Executive Secretary

SUBJECT : SE-20 25X1A9a

1. In connection with paragraph IV, A, 1. and 2., OPC's position and estimate is contained in the following paragraphs.

2. General: The present status of resistance forces on the mainland of China makes it necessary to approach the problem of Chinese Communist vulnerability directly from the standpoint of guerrilla capability. In Annex "B" to SE-20, prepared by OPC, a total of approximately 165,000 guerrillas is indicated as the best possible estimate. Viewed analytically in relation to present circumstances, or, in respect to any of the specific courses of action enumerated in the reference memorandum, the objective facts determining guerrilla capabilities on the mainland are as follows:

- a. Limited strength.
- b. Concentration in remote, inaccessible, relatively unimportant areas, principally in South China.
- c. Absence of central direction and coordination.
- d. Relative lack of organization and trained guerrilla leaders.
- e. Submarginal supply situation.
- f. Inadequate communication facilities.
- g. Indications of minimal operational activities.
- h. Institution of repressive and restrictive countermeasures by the Chinese Communists.

3. The total effect of the factors just mentioned is that, as of today, resistance forces in China have little or no capability. Therefore, Chinese Communist vulnerability is insignificant.

4. The foregoing characteristics of the present resistance movement in Communist China create a frame of reference which defines

their capabilities

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their capabilities quite clearly. It is obvious, for instance, that effective guerrilla action will not be manifest on a significant scale until an adequate preparation period has elapsed which denotes completion of the first phase of development of resistance elements. Basically, that means the establishment of contact and communication with existent groups, organization of these elements and areas, supply and resupply of established units, mobilizing and creating popular support for the partisan forces, initiating, extending and developing key areas, and maintaining control of the forces at our disposal.

5. The various courses of action mentioned in SE-20 bear on the problem of guerrilla capability and, therefore, on Communist vulnerability, primarily to the extent that they facilitate or retard the progressive development of a resistance movement as defined in the above paragraph. Inasmuch as the initial capabilities of present guerrilla forces have been assessed as relatively low, Communist China's vulnerability will only increase vis-a-vis the resistance movement as these forces develop to a point of maximum advantage. In respect to the several courses of action enumerated in SE-20, therefore, the following estimate of the situation is submitted:

a. Communist vulnerability to U.S. supported guerrillas in conjunction with full-scale attack in Korea and strategic bombing of Manchuria would be negligible.

b. Communist vulnerability to U.S. supported guerrillas in conjunction with a naval blockade and embargos would be negligible.

c. Communist vulnerability to U.S. supported guerrillas in conjunction with strategic bombing of the Chinese mainland would be increased to the extent to which the U.S. Government were able to allocate men, money and materiel to the purpose and then only after one year of development and organization.

d. Chinese Communist vulnerability to U.S. supported guerrillas in conjunction with a Nationalist landing with U.S. logistic support or with or without U.S. naval and air support would be increased to the extent to which the United States were willing to devote men, money and materiel, and contingent upon the success of the Nationalist landing as measured by the size of the lodgment obtained and the general course of the engagement. Under these circumstances at least one year would be required before a sufficient number of guerrillas could be armed, equipped and coordinated to make a significant contribution *in other areas of China.*

e. Chinese Communist vulnerability to U.S. supported guerrillas in conjunction with all the courses of action described above would be contingent upon the development of guerrilla capability, which in turn would ultimately depend upon the scope and pace of U.S. assistance to those guerrillas.

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6. Because of OPC's considered estimate of the limited current guerrilla capability, Chinese Communist vulnerability has not been broken into its obvious major components. However, while the present guerrilla movement is not characterized by any capability which would decisively affect Communist China's vulnerability, an analysis of the situation demonstrates that it would be of some value from a military point of view in interdicting communications and in tying down elements of the army and the militia. In addition, the location of most of these forces in South China would permit them to harass and impede to a certain extent the redeployment of troops from Manchuria to the southern border of China. In the meantime they are of value in slowing down political and economic consolidation of South China and in remaining a viable nucleus of passive resistance to the present regime by nurturing remnants of dissident elements. Continuance of aid to guerrilla forces under present circumstances, or in conjunction with one of the courses of action suggested, would undoubtedly contribute to an increased vulnerability of Communist China after one year. This is based on the assumption that we will proceed with a concerted program and unremitting effort to complete our first phase objectives. As mentioned before, this period would constitute a build-up of existent potential, and would extend the popular base of resistance. While it does not mean that effective guerrilla action will be launched on a widespread scale, it does mean that the capabilities of the guerrillas will be enhanced with a commensurate increase in the vulnerability of Communist China.

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Assistant Director for
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ANNEX "B" TO SE-20

1. The attached compilation of guerrilla strength by province is categorized as follows:

- a. Known guerrilla forces;
- b. Probable guerrilla forces;
- c. Unconfirmed but reported guerrilla forces.

2. The categories are defined as follows:

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b. Probable guerrilla forces include all units reported by at least two separate reliable sources;

c. Unconfirmed guerrilla forces include units on which reports have been received from sources of sufficient reliability to justify further investigation.

3. The probable guerrilla forces in the center column represent OPC's best estimate for the purpose of SE-20.

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